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Abstract
Public procurement can be used to achieve goals other than purely economic ones. Such goals 
are often referred to as “social linkages”. A preference for social considerations has been gaining 
ground against the dominant best value for money (BVM) paradigm over the past few decades. 
In the past, public procurement policies followed the principle of non-discrimination and free 
competition beyond national boundaries. Today considerations other than (purely economic) 
BVM have become relevant in public procurement policy and practice. Examples of social linkages 
in public procurement are found in various countries, from the well-known ‘Affirmative Action 
Programs’ in the US that advance minorities, women, persons with disabilities and veterans,1 to 
specific set-aside programs made available to only less-competitive businesses, such as women-
owned businesses, minority-owned businesses, businesses operating in economically disadvantaged 
areas, etc. Set-asides can be seen as social procurement linkages through the promotion of both 
supplier diversity and employment. The latter means that social use of public procurement can 
positively impact employment by providing opportunities to workers who are generally excluded 
from the labour market, while the former means that chances are given to less-competitive bidders. 
Set-aside programs have been widely developed in the US, which has a long tradition of set-aside 
contracts for special classes of small businesses, including small disadvantaged businesses, and 
in Canada where set-asides have been introduced for the development of Aboriginal businesses. 
However, the restriction of full and open competition that set-asides entail is frequently criticized 
by EU institutions. Despite this, the new European procurement framework also seems to have 
established set-asides as a means of providing economic opportunities to disadvantaged groups.
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1. Introduction
Every year, governments spend huge amounts of money for the purchase of goods, 
services and works from the private sector. Accounting for 15–20% of global GDP, 
“public procurement represents a substantial portion of the EU economy and the 
economies of many countries around the world”.2 The same holds true for  public pro-
curement commitments under the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Public 
Procurement (GPA), which have been estimated at around EUR 1.3 trillion.3
Traditionally, a main aim of public procurement was to achieve best value for 
money (BVM), limiting the risk of improper conduct on the buyer’s side. Along with 
this, in many countries, and not just in times of crisis, public procurement was also 
seen as a lever of industrial policy, including local development. In this context, vast 
and complex set-aside schemes were created in the US and other countries to benefit 
specific sets of bidders.
Legal integration at the regional level and neo-liberalism pushing for free trade at 
the global level have naturally been very suspicious of the use of the public procure-
ment lever for industrial policy aims, which are inevitably thought to be tainted by 
protectionism. They have unconditionally pushed for (purely economic) BVM as a 
tool to ensure fair competition among domestic and foreign bidders.
However, in the past few decades, considerations other than (purely economic) 
BVM have become relevant in public procurement policies. In particular, environmen-
tal and social considerations have been identified as procurement “linkages”, meaning 
that procurement can be used to achieve goals other than the purely economic ones.
Many different social goals can be met through public procurement, such as pro-
moting employment and equal opportunities, inclusion and accessibility. In this con-
text, some domestic legal frameworks have provided specific preferential programs 
that favor minorities and other disadvantaged socio-economic operators participat-
ing in tender procedures.
An example of a preferential program is the set-aside approach, as developed in the 
US and Canada. Set-aside programs reserve some public contracts for certain cate-
gories of bidders. The restriction of full and open competition entailed in set-asides 
has been frequently criticized by EU institutions and the Commission in particular.4
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between preferential programs, 
particularly set-asides and the social linkages of public procurement. To better focus 
on this topic, this paper will first analyze the rise of non-purely economic consider-
ations, in particular the social “linkages” of public procurement against the dominant 
BVM paradigm (2). Then, US and Canadian set-asides will be analyzed with specific 
reference to the program developed in the US that  favors small businesses, and the 
Canadian program for indigenous  entrepreneurs (3).
Finally, we will study the evolving EU legislative framework and chart its evolution 
from the initially timid (2004) acceptance of a sort of set-aside (sheltered workshops) 
to the broadening of this opportunity (2014) to sheltered workshops and social coop-
eratives (4). The paper closes with some conclusions (5).
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2. The rise of non-purely economic considerations in public procurement 
against the dominant BVM paradigm
Huge expenditures (mostly funded by taxpayers, at least in developed countries) on 
public procurement obviously require a strict set of rules and principles to ensure 
that purchasers act efficiently in the public interest. Over time, certain principles 
have been identified as crucial benchmarks for evaluating the extent to which public 
purchasing meets economic efficiency rules, limiting risks of improper conduct on 
the buyer’s side. To achieve economic efficiency, public procurement has traditionally 
focused on purely economic best value for money (BVM). This means that contract-
ing authorities have to obtain the quality and quantity of what they need at the lowest 
possible price through transparent, accountable and efficient procurement proce-
dures. A purely economic approach to public procurement has traditionally been 
seen as a guarantee of compliance with sound management of public funds.
In many countries and not just in times of crisis, public procurement has also been 
seen as a lever of industrial policy, including local development. In particular, public 
procurement was perceived much more frequently as an instrument “intimately in-
volved in securing national economic” policies.5 In fact, as some authors have argued, 
public procurement was used chiefly to meet domestic economic and political goals 
such as stimulating national economic activity, protecting national industries against 
foreign competition and improving the competitiveness of certain industrial sectors.6
In this context, several domestic procurement regimes, such as geographic prefer-
ence rules, were conditioned for protectionism. For instance, the 1933 Buy American 
Act (BAA) required the US government to prefer US-made products in its purchases 
and prohibited the acquisition of foreign goods by federal agencies by requiring that:
only unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been mined or produced 
in the United States, and only manufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have 
been manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or 
supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States, shall be purchased for 
public use.7
Moreover, vast and complex set-aside schemes were created in the US to reserve 
certain public contracts to specific bidders, namely small businesses.8
However, with the rise of neo-liberalism and legal integration at the regional level, 
this protectionism-oriented approach began to be perceived as a policy against free 
trade at the global level and as undermining the “fundamental business-based and 
value-oriented underpinnings of successful procurement regimes”.9 Greater atten-
tion has increasingly been paid to the enforcement of openness, competition and 
 non-discrimination procurement principles beyond national boundaries. In this con-
text, (purely economic) BVM has been seen as a tool to ensure fair and open compe-
tition among domestic and foreign bidders.
Within the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) system, this need 
for “greater liberalization and expansion of world trade” led to the Agreement on 
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Government Procurement (GPA).10 This multilateral agreement was signed in 1994 
and revised in 2014 by a number of WTO members. Its fundamental aim is to “mu-
tually open government procurement markets among its parties”.11 Pursuant to it, 
national measures that afford protection to domestic suppliers, goods or services, or 
that discriminate among foreign suppliers, goods or services, are considered as being 
against the Agreement.12
The same holds true for the European public procurement framework, where the 
need for non-discriminatory measures and openness is strongly underlined first and 
foremost by the EU Treaty, which establishes principles of non-discrimination, free 
movement of goods, freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment. Ad-
ditionally, some general principles of law, such as equality of treatment and transpar-
ency, have emerged from European Court of Justice case law and are clearly provided 
for by EU public procurement Directives, which are fully applicable for national 
above-threshold contracts. As a consequence of this complex legal framework, all 
national contracting authorities are required to ensure that national and EU bidders 
are treated equally in an open and fair market.13
Based on these principles, public procurement policies used to be aimed primarily 
at increasing both purchasing economic efficiency -- by obtaining the lowest possible 
price for goods, services and works -- and market openness -- by strengthening the 
competition principle beyond national boundaries.14 The combination of these two 
objectives is essential for “sustaining public and private confidence that public funds 
are being well spent”.15
However, in the past few decades, considerations other than (purely economic) 
BVM have become relevant in public procurement policy and practice, especially 
social and environmental considerations, both of which belong to the “sustainable 
public procurement” sphere (SPP). This means that public procurement can be used 
to meet broader political objectives. These non-purely-economic uses of public pro-
curement have been successfully called “linkages”,16 meaning that contracting au-
thorities may “link” certain policies as conditions to public contracts in order to 
reach sustainable solutions: the promotion of environmentally sustainable practices, 
also known as “green procurement”, as well as the promotion of socially responsi-
ble public procurement (SRPP). The latter includes the promotion of acceptable 
working conditions (e.g. minimum wages, working time standards, health and safety 
standards, etc.), social justice and human rights (i.e. employment opportunities for 
various employee groups, promotion of decent work, compliance with social and 
labour rights, reduction of the gender pay gap, social inclusion, accessibility and 
design for all, consideration of ethical and fair trade principles, and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), protection against human rights abuse, etc.).17
As a consequence of procurement linkages, the classical procurement goals to 
maximize profits and minimize costs are increasingly perceived as being no longer 
sufficient in themselves. “In addition to the government’s primary procurement 
goals, such as price, quality, best value, speed, and efficiency, the government has 
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secondary procurement goals, which are not directly related to the acquisition pro-
cess, but they are beneficial to the economy as a whole.”18 The lowest-possible-price 
approach seems to have lost its monopoly in procurement policy objectives.
Focusing more on “socially responsible public procurement” (SRPP), five types of 
“social linkages” have been specifically identified:
The use of procurement as a method of enforcing anti-discrimination law in the employ-
ment context (i); the use of procurement to advance a wider conception of distributive 
justice, particularly affirmative action in employment (ii); the use of procurement as a 
method to help stimulate increased entrepreneurial activity by disadvantaged groups de-
fined by ethnicity or gender (iii); the inclusion in procurement contracts of requirements 
to ensure fairness and equality when services are transferred from the public sector to 
the private sector (iv); and the use of procurement as a means of putting pressure on 
companies operating in other countries to conform to equality norms (v).19
Examples of social linkages in public procurement can be taken from different juris-
dictions, from the well-known ‘Affirmative Action Programs’ in the US established 
in the 1960s to advance minorities, women, persons with disabilities and veterans, 
to “the promotion of Canadian aboriginal business development by using selective 
set-asides for federal procurement, to the “preference point system in South Africa 
addressing several policy goals dealing with historically disadvantaged categories of 
persons by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability”.20
Among the above-mentioned linkages, we will focus on the use of procurement 
as a method to stimulate increased entrepreneurial activity by disadvantaged groups 
defined by ethnicity or gender. In this context, an important difference can be drawn 
between procurement linkages that promote supplier diversity and linkages in the 
employment context.21 The latter means that social use of public procurement can 
positively impact employment by providing opportunities to classes of workers, such 
as disadvantaged workers, who are generally excluded from the labour market.22 
Moreover, as a social linkage in promoting supplier diversity, social use of public 
procurement may lead to the involvement of less-competitive bidders that would 
have no chance in a competitive market.
Two main types of domestic programs can be set up to help disadvantaged eco-
nomic operators participate in tender processes: preferential and facilitative pro-
grams. While the latter seeks to help and encourage specific bidders to participate 
in public purchasing -- dividing large procurement into reasonably small lots, for 
instance -- the former, which includes set-aside programs, tends to create concrete 
business opportunities.23
More specifically, set-asides reserve certain public contracts to specific bidders 
that meet a number of criteria, including small businesses in general (as in the 
US), as well as specific classes of small businesses, such as minority businesses and 
other disadvantaged socio-economic operators.24 Through set-asides, governments 
are able to both promote supplier diversity, involving less-competitive bidders, and 
create employment opportunities for workers who are generally excluded from the 
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labour market. In fact, set-aside programs generally involve small or disadvantaged 
businesses, which, in turn, can provide more employment opportunities to work-
ers generally excluded from the labour market, such as disadvantaged workers or 
minorities.
However, the legitimacy of the set-asides approach in public procurement is often 
criticized for its inconsistency with the competition principle. For instance, prefer-
ence policies and set-asides, in particular, can be seen as discriminatory in the Euro-
pean legal framework.
How these considerations are mediated with purely economic objectives depends 
very much on choices made in any given jurisdiction.
3. Set-asides in the US and Canadian public procurement systems
Set-asides create business opportunities for specific less-competitive bidders, for 
whom certain public contracts are reserved. Through set-asides, contracting author-
ities are permitted to limit full and open competition, barring large businesses from 
bidding for certain contracts made available only to certain specific less- competitive 
businesses, such as women-owned businesses, minority-owned businesses, busi-
nesses operating in economically disadvantaged areas, etc.
While set-asides imply that full and open competition is limited to favour less- 
competitive enterprises that would otherwise have no chance on the open competi-
tive market, they can also be seen as a powerful social “linkage”.
Currently, two social linkages can be considered with regard to set-asides: linkages 
promoting supplier diversity and linkages in the employment context.25 The latter 
means that small businesses involved in set-aside programs impact positively on em-
ployment by providing -- to a greater degree than larger and competition oriented 
businesses can -- employment opportunities to workers who are generally excluded 
from the labour market, such as disadvantaged workers.26 Moreover, as a social link-
age in promoting supplier diversity, set-asides lead to the involvement of less-com-
petitive bidders that would have no chance in a competitive market.
Among those national legal frameworks having implemented this strategy (USA, 
Canada, South Africa, etc.), the United States has a long tradition of set-aside con-
tracts for special classes of small businesses. The notion of small business has grown 
to include women-owned small business (WOSB), economically disadvantaged 
women-owned small business (EDWOSB), veteran-owned small business (VOSB), 
service-disabled veteran-owned small business (SDVOSB), historically underuti-
lized business zone (HUBZone), small disadvantaged business under the Small 
Business Administration’s 8(a) Business Development Program, etc.27 Moreover, 
according to the 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assis-
tance Act (the so-called “Stafford Act”), which amended the earlier 1974 Disaster 
Relief Act, set-asides can also be provided for local firms during major disasters or 
emergencies.28
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Under the authority of the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) business develop-
ment program, contracts are set aside for “socially and economically disadvantaged 
small business concerns,” which includes firms at least 51% owned and uncondition-
ally controlled by Alaskan Native Corporations (ANCs), Indian tribes, Native Ha-
waiian Organizations (NHOs) or Community Development Corporations (CDCs).29 
More specifically, while contracts whose value exceeds the so-called “competitive 
threshold” are supposed to be set aside for 8(a) firms, contracts below that threshold 
are generally awarded on a sole-source basis, without competition among 8(a) firms. 
In this context, Alaskan Native Corporations (ANCs) are considered to be the most 
successful tenderers with at least one-third of all federal contracts awarded through 
the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) business development program.
This broad use of set-asides in the US has been justified by the fact that small busi-
nesses have historically been considered the backbone of American culture.30 This 
policy “reflects a national consensus on the importance of small businesses in the 
national economy”,31 which was initially provided to primarily satisfy the government 
interest in supplying during uneasy times of war.32 Later on, with the creation of the 
Small Business Administration in 1953 and the enactment of the Small Business 
Acts, particularly that of 1958, this policy increasingly evolved into a strategy to ben-
efit small businesses with a percentage of contract value reserved for less-competitive 
enterprises.33
This policy has been clearly incorporated into the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR), the primary regulation for the acquisition of supplies and services by all Fed-
eral Executive agencies. Under it, the Government’s policy is to “provide maximum 
practicable opportunities in its acquisitions” in favour of small business categories, 
including the opportunity to “participate as subcontractors in the contracts awarded 
by any executive agency, consistent with efficient contract performance”.34 Ensuring 
that a fair proportion of contracts for supplies and services are placed with small 
business is a task charged to the Small Business Administration (SBA).35
To win a set-aside contract, small businesses must meet specific requirements, pri-
marily related to their size, revenue, and independent ownership. Some certifications, 
generally in the form of self-declarations, are provided to ensure the company is truly 
qualified to receive set-aside contracts. “This allows the government to take portions 
of contracts that would have gone to large businesses and set-aside portions of those 
contracts for small businesses, effectively reducing the amount of revenue awarded 
to large businesses.”36
The restriction of eligible bidders through the use of set-asides is open to criti-
cism due principally to the negative impact on the competition principle. However, 
another type of criticism can be made regarding potential fraud. In fact, “by provid-
ing competitive advantages to small businesses, the federal government incentivizes 
large businesses to fraudulently pose as small businesses”,37 by falsely self-certifying 
their small-business quality. So, if too many large companies unlawfully benefit from 
 set-asides at the expense of actual small businesses, this clearly affects the social goals 
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of public procurement in supporting supplier diversity and in providing employment 
opportunities to disadvantaged workers. Indeed, critics have argued that small busi-
nesses do not effectively benefit from set-asides, and moreover, self-declarations are 
not an efficient means of proof to demonstrate compliance with the eligibility criteria 
for small businesses.38
Similar set-asides are also provided in other countries like Canada, where the fed-
eral government seeks to help Aboriginal peoples and communities -- namely First 
Nations, Inuit and Métis -- in “breaking down barriers to more fully participate in, 
and benefit from, the Canadian economy”, enjoying the same opportunities for em-
ployment, income and wealth creation as other Canadians.39
In this context, the Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development, 
launched in June 2009, seeks to meet the need to strengthen indigenous entrepre-
neurship “by promoting a business-friendly economic climate on reserve land and 
in the North, while improving access to capital and promoting other business op-
portunities, including procurement”.40 Procurement opportunities are currently pro-
vided through specific mandatory and voluntary set-aside programs introduced by 
the Procurement Strategy for Aboriginal Business (PSAB). While mandatory set-
asides concern only federal contracts that serve a primarily Aboriginal population 
and are worth more than $5,000, voluntary set-asides are left to the discretion of 
federal employees. In the latter case, federal contracting authorities are encouraged 
to voluntarily set aside opportunities for competition among Aboriginal businesses 
“whenever practical”, meaning where Aboriginal capacity exists and sound contract-
ing management can be assured and maintained.41
Aboriginal suppliers must be PSAB registered and self-certify that they meet two 
main criteria:
At least 51 per cent of the ownership and control must be made by Aboriginal (applica-
ble also for joint ventures in which an Aboriginal business or businesses have at least 51 
per cent of the ownership and control), at least 33 per cent of Aboriginal employees if 
the Aboriginal business has six or more full-time employees.42
In addition to self-certifications, compliance with these criteria is also ensured by 
a ‘potential’ audit by Consulting and Audit Canada (CAC).43 Evidence of compli-
ance with the above-mentioned requirements is not necessary at the time the bid is 
 submitted. However, the business should have evidence of eligibility “ready in case 
it is audited”.44
CAC can conduct two types of audit: pre-award and post-award audits. More 
 specifically, once a decision to set aside a procurement has been reported to the 
Access to Federal Procurement Directorate at Indian and Northern Affairs Can-
ada (INAC), the auditing authority performs a mandatory pre-award auditing for 
 requirements valued at, or in excess of, $2 million, or for requirements below this 
value when a need has been identified either by the requisitioning entity, the con-
tracting authority, or INAC. The pre-award auditing process can only begin once all 
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bids have been received and evaluated by the contracting authority.45 The contract-
ing authority informs INAC of the two best-assessed bidders, without disclosing 
the bid price. Then, the contracting authority receives CAC’s results once CAC has 
performed the audit. If it has been determined that the best-assessed bidder does not 
comply with the “Requirements for the Set-Aside Program for Aboriginal Business”, 
the next best-assessed bidder is awarded the contract if the bid meets the required 
conditions.46
Successful contractors with set-aside contracts may also be subject to post-award 
audits of their eligibility and fulfilment of the other requirements. Non-compliance 
with these requirements or any untrue statements have civil (i.e. non-criminal) con-
sequences including “forfeiture of the bid deposit; retention of the holdback; disqual-
ification of the business from participating in future contracts under the program; 
and/or termination of the contract”.47
4. The evolving EU legislative framework
The creation of a “level playing field for all businesses across Europe”48 within an EU 
Single Market was one of the main aims of the harmonization of European public 
procurement rules. Legislative harmonization has historically focused on facilitating 
competition, openness, transparency and non-discrimination through all EU Mem-
ber States49 as core principles of procurement procedures. These objectives are at the 
heart of the European Union’s (EU) “four freedoms” as established in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and people within EU boundaries (Articles 49 and 56).50 Member 
States’ governments must ensure that these four freedoms and the principles deriv-
ing from them, such as equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency, are 
not threatened or breached by national provisions. Moreover, national procedures 
for public contracts above a certain monetary value must be set up in accordance 
with EU Public Procurement Directives (2014/24/EU, 2014/23/EU, 2014/25/EU) 
to ensure that public procurement is open for competition across all EU Member 
States.51 In this context, the main aims of EU public procurement law has historically 
been competition and economic efficiency, with little regard for objectives other than 
purely economic ones.
However, some other considerations have recently gained prominence. Over the 
past few decades, the importance of overarching environmental and societal goals 
has been recognized more and more. However, while in the past, these goals were 
identified as “secondary” considerations in public procurement (“in contrast with 
the primary objective of a procurement of obtaining goods, works or services on the 
best terms”),52 they have been defined as strategic considerations in the evolving 
European framework.53 More specifically, while the previous Directive 2004/18/EC 
allowed procuring entities in Member States to take “secondary” environmental 
and social considerations into account, new and powerful terms were introduced 
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in the 2014 Directives, such as sustainable procurement and strategic procurement.54 
These new terms indicate that public procurement is “about more than just saving 
money”.55
As already pointed out, social strategic policies can go beyond the contractor’s 
compliance with general legal requirements, such as occupational health and safety, 
and providing broader social benefits.56 These benefits can “be limited to work on 
the contract itself -- for example, a requirement for a contractor to engage a certain 
proportion of disabled persons on the contract” or “may also extend beyond it” 
through specific mechanisms.57 For instance, a government can limit participation 
to particular groups by setting aside contracts in favour of them (as the US and 
Canada do).
Traditionally, the EU has been suspicious of set-asides because they discrim-
inate among economic operators and are therefore contrary to full and open 
 competition. However, under article 19 of Directive 2004/18/EC,58 replaced by 
article 20 of new Directive 2014/24/EU, specific set-asides were provided timidly 
at first, and only for sheltered workshops. Later they were extended to businesses 
whose main aim is to employ not just disabled workers but any disadvantaged 
person.
More specifically, the new Public Procurement Directive established that:
Member States may reserve the right to participate in public procurement procedures 
to sheltered workshops and economic operators whose main aim is the social and pro-
fessional integration of disabled or disadvantaged persons or may provide for such con-
tracts to be performed in the context of sheltered employment programmes, provided 
that at least 30% of the employees of those workshops, economic operators or pro-
grammes are disabled or disadvantaged workers.59
Compared to article 19 of Directive 2004/18/EC, which refers exclusively to work-
shops providing employment for disabled people, article 20 of the new Directive aims 
at creating employment and business’ opportunities not only for disabled people, 
but also for disadvantaged persons by reserving public contracts in favour of not just 
sheltered workshops but all economic operators whose main aim is to socially and 
professionally integrate disabled or disadvantaged persons. This provision clearly in-
troduces a social linkage in both the employment context and in supplier diversity, 
pushing for the participation in the tendering process of businesses employing gen-
erally excluded categories of workers, such as disabled and disadvantaged people.
However, there are no specifications on how the terms “disabled persons”, and 
particularly “disadvantaged persons”, “sheltered workshop” and “sheltered employ-
ment programme” should be interpreted. As has already been pointed out (for in-
stance, for the transposition of the 2014 Directives in certain countries)60, the legality 
of the use of the reserve depends on the notions covered by these terms, which need 
to be defined. This appears to be a national matter if no definitions are provided by 
the European directives.61 However, while domestic regulations should provide for a 
C. Cravero
184
definition, it should be taken into account how far this could jeopardize EU harmo-
nized rules.
For its part, the new EU Directive contents itself with underlining in the Preamble 
the significant role played by sheltered workshops in guaranteeing equal employment 
and occupation opportunities for all, including “disabled and disadvantaged persons, 
such as the unemployed, members of disadvantaged minorities or otherwise socially 
marginalised groups”.62
So, while under normal conditions of competition, sheltered workshops or disad-
vantaged businesses might not be able to obtain contracts, under the new rules they 
have an improved chance of winning public contracts. This provides an exception to 
the competition principle based on a socially-oriented justification. In fact, if these 
less competitive suppliers “were competitive by themselves on an open market, there 
would be no need for this exception”.63 Consequently,
it is appropriate to provide that Member States should be able to reserve the right to 
participate in award procedures for public contracts or for certain lots thereof to such 
workshops or businesses or reserve performance of contracts to the context of sheltered 
employment programmes.64
In addition to the provision of article 20 of Directive 2014/24/EU, article 77 of 
the same directive states that contracting authorities may also reserve the right 
to participate in award procedures for certain services in the fields of health, 
social and cultural services to “organisations which are based on employee own-
ership or active employee participation in their governance, and for existing or-
ganisations such as cooperatives to participate in delivering these services to end 
users”.65 The maximum duration of such contracts shall not be longer than three 
years.66
So, although in principle, the EU avoids small business policies that are preferen-
tial in nature, “due to concern over the potential for issues such as discrimination and 
unequal treatment between member nations”,67 in practice, the new EU Directive 
supports disadvantaged businesses providing employment for disabled and disad-
vantaged people, which would have no chance of obtaining a public contract in a 
competitive market.
However, how a business can demonstrate a socially-oriented aim remains a con-
troversial and unregulated matter at the EU level. There is no requirement in article 
20 (or in article 19 of the previous Public Procurement Directive) that sheltered 
workshops, programs or socially-oriented business must be certified as such.68 This 
implies that Member States can adopt different solutions with the risk of creating 
a fragmented patchwork. For instance, different national mechanisms can be de-
veloped to demonstrate that bidders are indeed sheltered workshops or socially- 
oriented businesses that meet specific national standards, which can again breach 
free movement rules when standards for bidders from certain countries are set higher 
than those from other countries.
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5. Conclusion
Governments “can use their purchasing power to advance conceptions of so-
cial justice goals” (also known as social linkages of public procurement).69 In 
this   context, contracting authorities are increasingly permitted to better take 
social aspects into account when awarding procurement contracts. This can be 
done on the basis of the best price-quality ratio (BPQR), which goes beyond a 
purely economic approach (principally based on the BVM), by choosing tenders 
that “provide more social advantages, such as a company employing the great-
est number of long-term unemployed or disadvantaged persons to perform the 
contract”.70
Awarding contracts no longer depends on price alone when a company commits to 
helping integrate disabled and disadvantaged persons.71
Set-asides represent a particular preference policy for implementing social linkages 
in public procurement. By limiting full and open competition, set-asides limit par-
ticipation in tendering processes to a particular group of bidders. This approach has 
been widely used in the US and Canada, but has always been treated with suspicion 
in the EU legal framework. However, set-asides were expressly permitted by the 2004 
EU Public Procurement Directives and then broadened by the 2014 Directives.
Set-asides appear to have become a powerful tool for providing economic opportu-
nities for disadvantaged groups in the EU as well. However, the creation of economic 
and business opportunities they entail is conditioned by requirements which must 
be verified. As the US experience demonstrates, self-certifications are insufficient to 
ensure the participation of the intended targeted businesses. Different mechanisms 
could be provided to improve the effectiveness of set-asides, such as specific reg-
istration for social bidders, regular audits and, more generally, guarantees that the 
contractor is eligible for the set-aside.72
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